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31. Introduction
The study of the asymptotic limit of the core along sequences of economies with
increasing numbers of individuals, what has been termed ’core equivalence’ in the
literature, has provided a foundation to the proposition that in large markets con-
sisting of relatively small participants individuals tend to exhibit price taking behav-
ior. With few exceptions core convergence results proceed through the identification
of prices which ’decentralize’ core outcomes, in the sense that core outcomes ap-
proximate (in some appropriate sense) the Walrasian demands of individuals at the
decentralizing prices, the approximation getting finer the larger the number of indi-
viduals. The deduction from these results is that the effort of individuals to exercise
market power by coordinating within coalitions, results in outcomes which are not
much different from those corresponding to price taking behavior at some appropri-
ate prices. Hence, the conclusion that price taking is a reasonable approximation of
the true behavior of individuals.
Nevertheless, the parsimony of the core with respect to the description of price
formation does not permit a clear insight to the strategic possibilities and incen-
tives of individuals to manipulate the prices which decentralize core allocations. In
core convergence results the decentralizing prices appear ’magically’ (to use the ex-
pression of a leader in the field) and not through some explicit mechanism, so it is
impossible to discern the extent of individuals’ influence on decentralizing prices and
its potential benefit. The intended contribution of the present paper is to tighten
this loose end, by showing that in large finite economies core allocations along with
the associated decentralizing prices are (in some approximate sense) Nash equilibria
of strategic market games, of the type originating in [16] and in [17].
We believe that the decentralization of core outcomes by means of Nash equilib-
rium of Shapley-Shubik type strategic market games has several conceptual advan-
tages. Those games feature an explicit price formation mechanism and rules of trade,
which put some flesh on the strategic possibilities of individuals to influence market
prices and also facilitate the modeling of the emergence of decentralizing prices and
core outcomes. Furthermore, the Nash equilibria of these games encapsulate the
idea that individuals cannot influence prices in their favor. Therefore, approximate
4decentralization of core allocations as Nash equilibria of such games signifies that in-
dividuals cannot obtain any substantial benefit from manipulating the decentralizing
prices, which fact is a bona fide justification of the price taking hypothesis. Con-
versely, a failure of core allocations along with the associated decentralizing prices
to satisfy (at least approximately) some Nash property, would cast serious doubts
to the merit of the argument in favor of price taking. For, such a failure would
imply that individuals could realize substantial benefits by manipulating the prices
which decentralize core allocations. Hence, we argue that decentralization of core
allocations as Nash equilibria, where price taking in finite economies is not assumed,
makes a lot of sense and strengthens the conclusion of core equivalence theorems,
because it accurately captures the spirit of their interpretation.
In view of this discussion we proceed in this paper to extend core equivalence
results to the non Walrasian framework. The strategic market games of the Shapley-
Shubik type are certainly not the only ones available in the literature, that could
be used for this purpose. Nevertheless, Shapley-Shubik strategic market games have
a Cournotian flavor which we find irresistible, because then we can claim that our
study reconciles two classic theories of competition: the theory of the core, which
is associated with Edgeworth, and the theory of Shapley-Shubik strategic market
games which is associated with Cournot.
There is a long list, in fact too long to cite here in any complete sense, of results on
the asymptotic convergence to Walrasian equilibria, both for the core and for Nash
equilibria of Shapley-Shubik strategic market games. A comprehensive and quite sys-
tematic survey of core convergence results along with references can be found in [2].
A number of authors, [5], [13], [10], [4], [12], [9], among many others, have pursued
the issue of asymptotic convergence of strategic market game outcomes to Walrasian
ones. Arguably, in view of these results some topological proximity between core
and Nash allocations holds true. However, though relevant, this proximity does not
capture the issue raised above, because it does not mean that core allocations and
the associated decentralizing prices are approximate Nash equilibria. Furthermore,
although the convergence of Nash equilibria implies proximity to some core alloca-
tions (notably the Walrasian ones), the proximity of every core allocation to a Nash
equilibrium is a different matter.
5The key result of the present paper is theorem (1), which asserts that in large finite
economies any core allocation can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium of a strategic
game with ’small’ transfers, defined on a ’nearby’ economy, the approximation to
the original market game and economy becoming finer as the number of individuals
becomes larger. Theorems (2) and (3) feature the desired conceptual conclusion con-
cerning the interpretation of core equivalence: the larger the number of individuals,
the smaller becomes the potential benefit of any deviation from the strategies which
implement a core allocation and the associated decentralizing prices.
We are not aware of any study of the asymptotic relationship of core and Nash
outcomes to one another. Nontheless, the results that we show in this paper com-
plement very well several existing ones. Let us mention here two of them which fit
nicely with ours. In [13], it is shown that in large finite economies Nash equilibrium
allocations are approximate Pareto optima. Theorem (4) in this paper demonstrates
that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic market game is an approximate core alloca-
tion. In [14] it has been demonstrated that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic market
game is an approximate Walras allocation for an economy which is ’near’ the original
one. Corollary (1) below shows the converse: a Walrasian equilibrium for a given
economy is a Nash equilibrium for an economy which is ’near’ the original one, in a
similar sense as in [14]. In a different paper [10] it is shown that given any sequence
of economies converging to a regular economy, the competitive equilibria of the lat-
ter can be approximated by a sequence of Nash equilibria drawn along the sequence.
Our result shows that for any Walrasian equilibrium of a given economy (not nec-
essarily regular) there is a sequence of economies and associated Nash equilibria so
that the sequence of economies converges to the original economy and the sequence
of Nash equilibria converges to the chosen Walrasian allocation.
Finally, besides the conceptual content of our results, the study of this issue will
link together the asymptotic convergence results of the core and Nash equilibria of
strategic market games and thereby, allow us to make inferences about the asymp-
totic limits of one concept, from the asymptotic behavior of the other. For example
it would open the path for the diffusion of asymptotic properties of the core to the
theory of strategic market games where they do not have a counterpart, such as the
rate of convergence of the core.
6We proceed to develop the context and the results. Some further comments follow
in the last section.
2. The model
Let H be a finite set of agents. There are L commodity types in the economy
and the consumption set of each agent is identified with <L+. Each individual h ∈ H
is characterized by a preference relation h⊂ <L+ × <L+ and an initial endowment
eh ∈ <L+. We use the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. Preferences are C2, convex and strictly monotone.
Assumption 2. Indifference surfaces through the endowment do not intersect the
axes.
Denote by P2cm the set of preferences that satisfy (1) and by P2cmb the set of prefer-
ences that satisfy (1) and (2), both endowed with the topology of closed convergence.
Let T ⊂ P2cm ×<L++ be compact. An economy is defined as a mapping E : H → T .
In the sequel we will need a way to express ’proximity’ between economies defined
on the same set H of consumers. For this purpose we will use a metric defined on
economies, which is a variation of the one used in [14]. Given two preference relations
 and ′ let d(,′) metrize the topology of closed convergence. Recall that when
u : <L+ → < and v : <L+ → < represent  and ′ respectively, then if | u(·)−v(·) |→ 0
uniformly on compact sets then d(,′)→ 0. Given two economies E : H → T and
E ′ : H → T ′, following [14] we define now
(1) σ(E , E ′) = 1
#H
∑
h∈H
[d(h,′h) + 2
‖ eh − e′h ‖∑
h∈H eh + e
′
h
]
The set of feasible allocations of a given economy E , is
F =
{
x ∈ <LH+ :
∑
h∈H
xh =
∑
h∈H
eh
}
The standard definition of the core of an economy E is as follows:
Definition 1. The core is the set C(E) ⊂ F such that:
6 ∃S ⊂ H and y ∈ <LS+ s.t.
∑
h∈S
yh =
∑
h∈S
eh and yh h xh,∀h ∈ S.
The above definition identifies allocations with the property that no group of in-
dividuals can redistribute their endowments in a way that is unanimously preferred
by all its members. The theory of the core postulates that an equilibrium outcome
7should be characterized by this property. Notice that the procedure via which al-
ternative redistributions of endowments (and core outcomes) are conducted, is left
unspecified. The idea of ’decentralization’ of the core is that, under some qualifica-
tions, in large finite economies the process by which core outcomes are attained can
be effectively approximated by a system of Walrasian markets.
It will be useful for our purposes to have an approximate version of the core
property, which requires that a blocking allocation be ’substantially’ preferred by all
members of a coalition. In order to model this idea it will be convenient to introduce
some notation. Given  > 0 and y ∈ <L+ denote y 	 1L = (max{yi − , 0})Li=1. We
can now state the following definition that we will use in the sequel.1
Definition 2. Given  > 0 the -core (or approximate core) is the set C(E) ⊂ F
such that:
6 ∃S ⊂ H and y ∈ <LS+ s.t.
∑
h∈S
yh =
∑
h∈S
eh and yh 	 1L h xh, ∀h ∈ S.
Obviously C(E) ⊂ C(E). In fact, a core allocation is one that belongs to every
-core.
We now turn to describe a strategic market game, which proposes an explicit
model of how exchange in the economy takes place. The version of the strategic
market game below has been studied in [13] and in [12].
2.1. Trade using inside money. Trade in the economy is organized via a system
of trading posts where individuals offer commodities for sale and place bids for
purchases of commodities. Bids are placed in terms of a unit of account. The
strategy set of each agent is Sh = {(bh, qh) ∈ <2L+ : qih ≤ eih, i = 1, 2, . . . , L}. Given
a strategy profile (b, q) ∈ ∏h∈H Sh let Bi = ∑h∈H bih and Qi = ∑h∈H qih denote
aggregate bids and offers for each i = 1, 2, . . . , L. Also for each agent h denote
Bi−h =
∑
k 6=h b
i
k, Q
i
−h =
∑
k 6=h q
i
k. For a given a strategy profile, consumption of
each commodity i = 1, 2, . . . , L by each consumer h ∈ H is determined as follows:
(2) xih (b, q) =
{
eih − qih +
bih
Bi
Qi if
∑L
i=1
Bi
Qi
qih ≥
∑L
i=1 b
i
h
eih − qih otherwise
1Several alternative definitions of approximate cores have appeared in the literature. The one
we use here is a variant of that in [18] or [19]. For several equivalence results between approximate
cores and approximate Walras equilibria see [8].
8where it is postulated that whenever the term 0/0 appears in the expressions above it
is defined to equal zero. When BiQi 6= 0 the fraction pii(b, q) = Bi
Qi
has a natural in-
terpretation as the (average) market clearing ’price’. The relation
∑L
i=1 pi
i(b, q)qih ≥∑L
i=1 b
i
h is a ’bookkeeping’ restriction which ensures that units of account remain at
zero net supply (inside money). The interpretation of this allocation mechanism is
that commodities (money) is distributed among non bankrupt consumers in propor-
tion to their bids (offers), while the purchases of bankrupt consumers are confiscated.
An equilibrium is defined as a strategy profile (b, q) ∈∏h∈H Sh that forms a Nash
equilibrium in the ensuing game with strategic outcome function given by (2). Let
N(E) ⊂∏h∈H Sh denote the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the strategic
market game and N (E) ⊂ <LH+ the set of consumption allocations corresponding to
the elements of N(E).
2.2. Games with transfers. Just as we often do in exchange economies we may
be interested in outcomes which can be sustained as some kind of equilibrium, when
some income transfers among individuals are allowed. This can be done just as well
in the present context. Let us develop a variant of the original market game which
captures this idea. Let (p, x) ∈ ∆L×F be a price vector and an (feasible) allocation.
Consider a strategic market game, which is defined exactly as in the previous section
except that the allocation rule is now as follows:
(3) xˆih (b, q; p, x) =
{
eih − qih +
bih
Bi
Qi if
∑L
i=1
(
bih − B
i
Qi
qih
)
≤ p (xh − eh)
eih − qih otherwise
This modified allocation rule differs from the original one, only in that individuals
are required to satisfy a different budget constraint, which involves credits/liabilities
imposed on individuals determined by the pre specified allocation x along with the
vector p. By virtue of the fact that the pre specified allocation x is feasible, those
lump sum transfers cancel out on the aggregate so the unit of account remains in
zero net supply (money is still ’inside’). Of course, if p (xh − eh) = 0 for all h ∈ H,
then (3) is the same as the original one. Moreover, for arbitrarily small transfers the
budget restrictions imposed on individuals are arbitrarily close to those imposed by
the original allocation rule.
9Definition 3. A transfer market game is the strategic market game induced by the
strategic outcome function defined in (3).
We denote by N(p,x)(E) the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the cor-
responding (p, x)-transfer strategic market game and by N(p,x)(E) the set of corre-
sponding consumption allocations.
The following notation and familiar facts will be useful in the sequel. Fix (b−h, q−h) ∈∏
k 6=h Sk and let
2 g(y) =
∑L
i=1
Bi−h(y
i−eih)
Qi−h−yi+eih
. The set of allocations which an individual
h ∈ H can achieve via the strategic outcome function (3) is given3 by the convex set
γh = {y ∈ <L+ : g(y) ≤ p (xh − eh) , y ≤ Q−h + eh}
i.e., (bh, qh) ∈ Sh ⇒ xˆh (b, q; p, x) ∈ γh. Conversely, xh ∈ γh ⇒ ∃(bh, qh) ∈
Sh s.t. xh = xh (b, q). Therefore, due to the bankruptcy rule imposed by (3), at
an equilibrium with nonzero bids and offers we have that x¯ ∈ N(p,x)(E) if and only
if:
(i) x¯ = xˆ(b¯, q¯; p, x), for some (b¯, q¯) ∈
∏
h∈H
Sh
(ii) ∀h ∈ H, γh ∩ {y ∈ <L+ : y h x¯h} = ∅(4)
Finally, in the sequel we will also refer to approximate Nash equilibria, which are
defined along the lines of [15] as follows:
Definition 4. For a given  > 0 we say that x¯ ∈ γh is an -Nash equilibrium
allocation if:
(i) x¯ = xˆ (b, q; p, x) , for some (b, q) ∈
∏
h∈H
Sh
(ii) ∀h ∈ H, γh ∩ {y ∈ <L+ : y 	 1L h xh} = ∅(5)
In accordance with our previous notation let N(p,x)(E) ⊂
∏
h∈H Sh denote the
set of approximate Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the strategic market game
and N (p,x)(E) ⊂ <LH+ the corresponding set of consumption allocations. Certainly,
N (E) ⊂ N (E). In fact, x ∈ N (E) if and only if x ∈ N (E) for all  > 0.
2In order to save on notation we omit the dependency on (b−h, q−h) and (p, x). In the results
the values of those variables will be fixed so no confusion should arise.
3This is obtained by a straightforward manipulation of (3); see [13], [12] or [10].
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The interpretation of an -Nash equilibrium is that individuals optimize ’up to
’. This definition expresses the idea that the actual best responses do not provide
’substantial’ improvements over a given allocation. Technically, this is represented by
the proximity between the sets involved in (4) and (5). The continuity of preferences
suggests that any y ∈ γh is not ’far’ better than xh.
We are ready now to proceed with the results of this paper.
3. Results
We begin with the first result of this paper which associates core allocations of a
given economy with the Nash equilibria of a nearby economy.
Theorem 1. Let E : H → T , where T ⊂ P2cmb × [1s , s]L is compact, be an economy
and xˆ ∈ C(E). For every  > 0 there is N such that if #H > N , there is an economy
E ′ : H → P2cm × [1s , s]L, where σ(E , E ′) < , a vector pˆ ∈ ∆L and (bˆ, qˆ) ∈ N(pˆ,xˆ)(E ′)
such that xˆ = xˆ(bˆ, qˆ; pˆ, xˆ), pi(bˆ, qˆ) = pˆ and |pˆ(xˆh − eh)| < .
Proof:
Since core allocations are Pareto optima, by the second welfare theorem there is a
pˆ ∈ ∆L, where pˆ 0 such that for all h ∈ H:
(6) x h xˆh ⇒ pˆx > pˆxˆh
Given the vector pˆ we can define:
(7) ηih =
pˆi
(
xˆih − eih
)∑
k 6=h xˆ
i
h
We construct a new economy E ′ : H → P2cm × [1s , s]L, defined as E ′(h) = (′h, eh),
where for each h ∈ H, ′h is the preference relation defined as follows:
(8) x ′h y ⇔ min{pˆz : z h x}+ ηhx ≥ min{pˆz : z h y}+ ηhy
We first show that the core allocation xˆ is a Nash equilibrium for the (pˆ, xˆ)-transfer
game defined on the economy E ′. Let (bˆ, qˆ) ∈∏h∈H Sh be the strategy profile defined
as follows: bˆih = pˆ
ixˆih, qˆ
i
h = e
i
h, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , L. In this case:
(9) pii(bˆ, qˆ) =
Bˆi
Qˆi
=
∑
h∈H pˆ
ixˆih∑
h∈H e
i
h
= pˆi
∑
h∈H xˆ
i
h∑
h∈H e
i
h
= pˆi
Therefore, pi(bˆ, qˆ) = pˆ. Furthermore, for each h ∈ H:
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(10)
L∑
i=1
(bˆih −
Bˆi
Qˆi
qˆih) =
L∑
i=1
pˆi(xˆih − eih)
Hence, it follows that since no individual is bankrupt,
xˆih(bˆ, qˆ; pˆ, xˆ) = e
i
h − qˆih + bˆih
Qˆi
Bˆi
= eih − eih +
pˆixˆih
pˆi
= xˆih
i.e., xˆh(bˆ, qˆ; pˆ, xˆ) = xˆh, ∀h ∈ H.
Let us fix h ∈ H. Clearly xˆh ∈ γh, because xˆh ≤ Qˆ−h + eih and also
(11) g(xˆh) =
L∑
i=1
Bˆi−h(xˆ
i
h − eih)
Qˆi−h − xˆih + eih
=
L∑
i=1
pˆi(xˆih − eih)
In particular, (11) implies that xˆh lies on the boundary of the set γh which is
convex. Hence, there is a ph ∈ <L+, specifically ph = Dg(xˆh), such that z ∈ γh ⇒
phz ≤ phxˆh. Notice that
ph = Dg(xˆh) =
(
Bˆi−hQˆ
i
−h
(Qˆi−h − xˆih + eih)2
)L
i=1
Substituting for the strategies we further have that ph = pˆ+ ηh ≥ 0.
Therefore, we deduce that
(12) z ∈ γh ⇒ (pˆ+ ηh)z ≤ (pˆ+ ηh)xˆh
Now, suppose that y ′h xˆh for some h ∈ H. By definition of ′h we have:
(pˆ+ ηh)y ≥ min{pˆz : z h y}+ ηhy
> min{pˆz : z h xˆh}+ ηhxˆh
= (pˆ+ ηh)xˆh(13)
where the last equality follows from (6). Therefore, it follows from (12) that y 6∈ γh.
Since y is arbitrary, we conclude that y ′h xˆh ⇒ y 6∈ γh, which implies
(14) γh ∩ {y ∈ <L+ : y ′h xˆh} = ∅
Thus, (bˆ, qˆ) ∈ N(pˆ,xˆ)(E ′), xˆ(bˆ, qˆ) = xˆ and pi(bˆ, qˆ) = pˆ as desired.
We now show that when the number of individuals is sufficiently large, the trans-
fers necessary in the market game that implements the core allocation are arbitrarily
small and the economy E ′, is arbitrarily close to the original economy E .
By proposition 7.4.3 in [11] (see also [6]) we have that since pˆ ∈ ∆L supports xˆ
which is in the core, there is a constantM > 0 so that |pˆ(xˆh−eh)| ≤ M#H . Therefore,
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by choosing N1 > M we have that for each h ∈ H, |pˆ(xˆh− eh)| <  for all #H > N1
as needed.
To demonstrate the proximity of the economies, we first need to fix a compact set
on which preferences of the two economies are near each other. Since T is compact,
core allocations are uniformly bounded (see [7] p.193 Proposition 2), i.e., there is
r > s such that x ∈ C(E)⇒ xh ∈ [1r , r]L, ∀h ∈ H. Therefore,
∣∣ηih∣∣ = ∣∣pˆi(xˆih − eih)∣∣∑
k 6=h xˆ
i
h
≤
∣∣xˆih − eih∣∣∑
k 6=h xˆ
i
h
≤ xˆ
i
h + e
i
h∑
k 6=h xˆ
i
h
≤ 1
#H − 1
(
2r
1/r
)
=
2r2
#H − 1(15)
Define the set Ch = {x ∈ <L+ : (pˆ + ηh)x ≤ (pˆ + ηh)xˆ}. The compactness of
T implies that there is δ > 0 such that if (, e) ∈ T , x ≤ 1Lr and x  e, then
D(x)  δ1L, where D(·) denotes the (normalised) gradient vector of . Since
pˆ = Dh(xˆh), for each h ∈ H we have that pˆ δ1L. Now, by choosing N2 > 1+ 4r
2
δ
we have that for all #H > N2, |ηh| < δ21L, for each h ∈ H. Hence, pˆ+ ηh  δ21L. It
follows that Ch ⊆ {x ∈ <L+ : ( δ21L)x ≤ (1 + δ2L)r}, i.e., if we set r¯ = 2+δLδ r we have
Ch ⊂ [0, r¯]L. This last set will do for our purpose.
Since |ηhx| < 2r2r¯L#H−1 for all x ∈ [0, r¯]L we have that if (, e) ∈ T then min{pˆz :
z  x} + ηhx → min{pˆz : z  x} uniformly on [0, r¯]L, so d(,′) → 0. Therefore,
there is N > N2 such that when #H > N then d(,′) < . In this case we have
σ(E , E ′) <  as well. 
Walrasian allocations are in the core so the preceding theorem applies to them
as well. Since Walrasian allocations are of particular interest we state below the
relevant version of our result. Notice that in the case of Walrasian allocations no
modification of the market game is necessary, because Walrasian allocations can be
supported without any income transfers.
Corollary 1. Let E : H → T be an economy and (p¯, x¯) ∈ ∆L×<LH+ be a Walrasian
equilibrium of this economy. For every  > 0 there is N such that if #H > N , there
13
is an economy E ′′ : H → P2cm × [1s , s]L, where σ(E , E ′′) < , and a Nash equilibrium
for the market game defined on this economy, (b¯, q¯) ∈ N(E ′′) such that x(b¯, q¯) = x¯
and pi(b¯, q¯) = p¯.
In [14] it is shown that Nash equilibrium allocations of a given economy are ap-
proximate Walras for an economy which is near the original one. The last corollary
is a converse of that result. It states that Walrasian allocations for a given economy
are Nash equilibrium allocations for a nearby economy.
Finally, corollary (1) implies that given an atomless economy and any competitive
equilibrium (not necessarily regular), there is a sequence of economies and associ-
ated Nash equilibria which approximate the given atomless economy and competitive
equilibrium. A result to this effect for regular economies is shown in [10]. The differ-
ence is that here we have more flexibility in constructing the appropriate sequence
of economies, whereas [10] considers a fixed sequence of economies and associated
limit.
In the above result we used an approximation of the original economy, in order
to associate core allocations with (exact) Nash equilibria. The next result does not
involve a perturbation of the original economy, at the cost of relaxing the notion of
Nash equilibrium. In this result core allocations are implemented as approximate
Nash equilibria (see [15]).
Theorem 2. Let E : H → T be an economy where T ⊂ P2cmb × [1s , s]L is compact,
and xˆ ∈ C(E). Given  > 0 there is a number N such that if #H > N , there is
pˆ ∈ ∆L and (bˆ, qˆ) ∈ N(pˆ,xˆ)(E) such that xˆ = xˆ(bˆ, qˆ; pˆ, xˆ) and pi(bˆ, qˆ) = pˆ.
Proof: Let pˆ ∈ ∆L, (ηh)h∈H , r, r¯, δ > 0 and (bˆ, qˆ) ∈
∏
h∈H Sh be as in the proof of
theorem (1). Consider  > 0 and choose N > 1 + 4r
2r¯L
δ , so that if #H > N then for
each h ∈ H we have |ηhx| < δ2 for all x ∈ [0, r¯]L.
Suppose by way of contradiction that xˆh 6∈ N (pˆ,xˆ)(E). Then for some h ∈ H there
must be: y ∈ γh ∩ {z ∈ <L+ : z 	 1L h xˆh} 6= ∅. Since y 	 1L h xˆh, there must
be some i = 1, 2, . . . , L, say i = 1, so that y1 > . In this case we have
14
pˆ(y 	 1L) =
L∑
i=1
pˆimax{yi − , 0}
≤ pˆy − pˆ1
< pˆy − δ(16)
Furthermore, since y 	 1L h xˆh we have that
(17) min{pˆz : z h y 	 1L} > min{pˆz : z h xˆh} = pˆxˆh
Therefore, pˆ(y − δ) > pˆ(y 	 1L) ≥ min{pˆz : z h y 	 1L} > pˆxˆh so
pˆy > pˆxˆh + δ > pˆxˆh + ηhxˆh − ηhy
But then (pˆ+ ηh)y > (pˆ+ ηh)xˆh, which contradicts y ∈ γh. 
Remark 1. Notice the nice conceptual implication of theorem (2): deviations from
the strategies which implement the core allocation, cannot not provide substantial
improvements in payoff (improvements can be only up to ). In particular, the best
response of each individual can, at best, be marginally more advantageous than the
strategy which implements the core allocation. Therefore, there can be only meager
benefits from manipulating the price that supports a core allocation. Of course, the
same observations hold for Walrasian allocations since they are elements of the core.
In the preceding theorems we used the supporting prices of core allocations. By
appealing to a theorem in [1] we can obtain a result which is akin to the one appearing
in that paper. The assumptions on characteristics can be somewhat relaxed in this
case thanks to the generality of the core equivalence theorem that we appeal to. In
fact, we can consider the set Pmb of preferences which are weakly monotonic and
satisfy assumption (2).
Theorem 3. Let E : H → T be an economy where T ⊂ Pmb × [1s , s]L and xˆ ∈ C(E).
There is pˆ ∈ ∆L, (bˆ, qˆ) ∈∏h∈H Sh and K > 0 such that:
(i) xˆ = xˆ(bˆ, qˆ; pˆ, xˆ) and pi(bˆ, qˆ) = pˆ.
(ii)
∑
h∈H |pˆ(xˆh − eh)| < K
(iii)
∑
h∈H |min{pˆz : z h yh} −min{pˆz : z h xˆh}| < K
for all y ∈∏h∈H(γh ∩ {z ∈ <L+ : z h xˆh})
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Proof: Let pˆ ∈ ∆L be the price vector associated with xˆ in Anderson’s theorem,
i.e.,
(18)
∑
h∈H
|pˆxˆh −min{pˆz : z h xˆh}| ≤M
and
(19)
∑
h∈H
|pˆ(xˆh − eh)| ≤M
where M = 2sL3/2. By continuity it can be assumed that pˆ  0. Consider R > 0
such that C(E) ⊆ [ 1R , R]L. Let (ηh)h∈H and (bˆ, qˆ) ∈
∏
h∈H Sh be as in the proof of
theorem (1). For this profile of strategies we have that claim (i) of the theorem is
true. Finally, take R¯ > 0 such that γh ⊂ [0, R¯]L for each h ∈ H.
Fix an h ∈ H and let yh ∈ γh. Since |ηhx| ≤‖ ηh ‖‖ x ‖< R(R+s)R¯L#H−1 for all
x ∈ [0, R¯]L, we have ηh(xˆh − yh) ≤ 2R(R+s)R¯L#H−1 .
Suppose that for some h ∈ H we have min{pˆz : z h yh} > pˆxˆh + 2R(R+s)R¯L#H−1 .
It follows that min{pˆz : z h yh} > pˆxˆh + ηh(xˆh − yh).
However, in this case we have pˆyh ≥ min{pˆz : z h yh} > pˆxˆh + ηh(xˆh − yh) which
implies (pˆ+ ηh)yh > (pˆ+ ηh)xˆh contradicting yh ∈ γh. Therefore,
yh ∈ γh ⇒ min{pˆz : z h yh} ≤ pˆxˆh + 2R(R+ s)R¯L#H − 1
Hence, whenever yh ∈ γh ∩ {z ∈ <L+ : z h xˆh} we have for each h ∈ H
0 ≤ min{pˆz : z h yh} −min{pˆz : z h xˆh}
≤ pˆxˆh −min{pˆz : z h xˆh}+ 2R(R+ s)R¯L#H − 1(20)
Summing up over all individuals and using (18) along with #H ≥ 2 we have that
for all y ∈∏h∈H(γh ∩ {z ∈ <L+ : z h xˆh}):
(21)
∑
h∈H
|min{pˆz : z h y} −min{pˆz : z h xˆh}| ≤M + 4R(R+ s)R¯L
Taking K = M + 4R(R + s)R¯L proves claim (iii) of the theorem. Finally by (19)
and M < K we have
∑
h∈H |pˆ(xˆh− eh)| < K which proves claim (ii) of the theorem.

The interpretation of theorem (3) is that, if the sets of core and attainable market
game allocations remain bounded as the number of individuals becomes large the
following are true: the average transfer needed to implement a core allocation via a
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market game converges to zero. Also the average payoff gains over the core allocation,
which are attainable via the market game, converge to zero. The last conclusion is
especially true for the ’best response’ bundle of each individual, to the strategies
which implement the core allocation, as the following corollary states.
Corollary 2. Let E : H → T be an economy, where T ⊂ Pmb × [1s , s]L, and
xˆ ∈ C(E). There is pˆ ∈ ∆L, (bˆ, qˆ) ∈∏h∈H Sh and K > 0 such that:
(i) xˆ = xˆ(bˆ, qˆ; pˆ, xˆ) and pi(bˆ, qˆ) = pˆ.
(ii) Letting y¯ ∈∏h∈H γh be such that γh∩{z ∈ <L+ : z h y¯h} = ∅ for each h ∈ H,
we have
∑
h∈H |min{pˆz : z h y¯h} −min{pˆz : z h xˆh}| < K.
Since Walrasian equilibrium allocations are in the core, the last corollary applies
to them as well. We state this fact as a separate conclusion since it has obvious
implications regarding the relationship of Walras allocations to Nash equilibria.
Corollary 3. Let E : H → T be an economy, where T ⊂ Pmb× [1s , s]L, and (p¯, x¯) ∈
∆L × <LH+ be a Walrasian equilibrium of this economy. There is (b¯, q¯) ∈
∏
h∈H Sh
and K > 0 such that:
(i) x¯ = x(b¯, q¯) and pi(b¯, q¯) = p¯.
(ii) Letting y¯ ∈∏h∈H γh be such that γh∩{z ∈ <L+ : z h y¯h} = ∅ for each h ∈ H,
we have
∑
h∈H |min{p¯z : z h y¯h} − p¯x¯h| < K.
Notice that no claim of a Nash property is mentioned in this corollary. Neverthe-
less, it roughly states that the strategies which implement the Walrasian allocation
via the strategic market game are asymptotically best responses to each other, i.e.,
the Walrasian allocation is asymptotically a Nash equilibrium.
For theorem (3) we have appealed to [1] because it is the most basic approximation
theorem for the core that we are aware of. Another interesting result to extend
to the non Walrasian framework along the same lines is the one appearing in [3].
An extension of that result would establish that in large finite economies given a
core allocation there is a Nash equilibrium of a strategic market game with small
transfers, with the property that almost all individuals are indifferent between their
core and Nash equilibrium allocations. It should be emphasized that in all cases the
uniform boundedness of core allocations, which in turn is due to the compactness
of characteristics, is crucial for the proximity between core and Nash properties of
equilibrium allocations. This fact is not merely a technical observation. It has some
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economic content because it suggests that lack of individual ability to exercise market
power in a market game, does not imply nor it is implied by inability of coalitions to
do so in the core. This is the case only when individual characteristics are not too
diverse. Finally, with stronger conditions on the characteristics and the sequences
of economies the approximation conclusions in claims (ii) and (iii) in theorem (3)
can be strengthened to maximum rather than average deviations by appealing to
stronger core convergence theorems (for example [11], proposition 7.4.9, p.285).
We finally turn to a result in the converse direction relating Nash equilibria to the
core property.
Theorem 4. Consider a sequence of economies {En}n∈N , where En : Hn → T ,
#Hn →∞ and T ⊂ Pcm× [0, s]L is compact. Let (bn, qn) ∈ N(En) and suppose that
for n large enough pin = pi(bn, qn) α1L for some α > 0, so that the corresponding
xn ∈ N (En) is fully active. Then given any  > 0 we have xn ∈ C(En) for all n large
enough.
Proof: Let us fix xn ∈ N (En) and recall a few useful facts.
By the strict monotonicity of preferences, for each h ∈ Hn, xn,h lies on the
boundary of the convex set γn,h and since preferences are also convex, the vector
pn,h = Dg(xn,h) = (pii
Qin,−h
Qin,−h−xin,h+eih
)Li=1 has the following separating property:
∀z ∈ γn,h, pn,hz ≤ pn,hxn,h and ∀z h xn,h, pn,hz > pn,hxn,h
Since T is compact by proposition (1) in [9] (see also [10], proposition 1, p.189),
N (En) is uniformly bounded so for some c > 0 we have ‖ xn,h − eh ‖≤ c1L, for each
h ∈ Hn.
Furthermore, since pin  α1L then for n large enough 1#HnQn  β1L for some
β > 0. Thus, by passing to a subsequence if necessary we may assume that there is
ξ > 0 so that #{h ∈ Hn : qih ≥ ξ} ≥ #Hnξ for all i = 1, 2, . . . , L. In this case, we
have that for all h ∈ Hn, Qin,−h = Qin − qin,h ≥ Qin − s ≥ #Hnξ2 − s.
Therefore, ‖ pn,h − pin ‖≤ Lmax{ x
i
n,h−eih
Qin,−h−xin,h+eih
: i = 1, 2, . . . , L} ≤ Lc
#Hnξ2−s−c ,
for each h ∈ Hn, for n large enough. Hence, given any θ > 0 by choosing #Hn >
Lc+(s+c)θ
θξ2
we can ensure that: ‖ pn,h−pin ‖≤ θ, ∀h ∈ Hn. Take θ = α+2Ls and choose
N so that if #Hn > N then ‖ pn,h − pin ‖< θ for each h ∈ Hn.
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We can now start the proof of our theorem. Suppose xn 6∈ C(En). Since xn ∈ Fn,
the following must be true:
(22) ∃S ⊂ Hn and y ∈ <LS+ so that
∑
h∈S
yh =
∑
h∈S
eh and yh 	 1L h xn,h,∀h ∈ S.
Fix any h ∈ S. By the separating property of the vector pn,h we have that
pn,h(yh 	 1L) > pn,hxn,h. Furthermore, since eh ∈ γn,h we have pn,heh ≤ pn,hxˆh so
we conclude that pn,h(yh 	 1L) > pn,heh.
Since yh	 1L h xˆh, by renumbering if necessary we may assume y1h > . Hence,
we have pn,h(yh 	 1L) =
∑L
i=1 p
i
n,hmax{yih − , 0} ≤ pn,hy − p1n,h so, it follows
that pn,hyh > pn,heh + p1n,h. In this case (pin + θ1L)yh > (pin − θ1L)eh + (pi1n − θ).
Therefore, it follows that:
(pin + θ1L)yh > (pin − θ1L)eh + (pi1n − θ)
> (pin − θ)eh + (α− θ)
= pineh + α− θ(+ 1Leh)
= pineh + θ(+ 2Ls)− θ(+ 1Leh)
= pineh + θ(2Ls− 1Leh)(23)
where the fourth equality is due to the choice of θ. Since eh ≤ 1Ls we have that
Ls = 1L1Ls ≥ 1Leh. Therefore, from (23) it further follows that
(pin + θ1L)yh > pineh + θ(2Ls− 1Leh)
≥ pineh + θ1Leh
= (pin + θ1L)eh(24)
Since (24) is true for all h ∈ S, by summing up we obtain:
(25) (pin + θ1L)
∑
h∈S
yh > (pin + θ1L)
∑
h∈S
eh
However,
∑
h∈S yh =
∑
h∈S eh and since pin + θ1L 6= 0 we have that (25) implies
(pin + θ1L)
∑
h∈S
eh = (pin + θ1L)
∑
h∈S
yh > (pin + θ1L)
∑
h∈S
eh
which is a contradiction. 
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4. Concluding Remarks
We have attempted here to articulate some results that relate the core to Nash
equilibria of strategic market games by extending core equivalence results to the
non Walrasian context. In this way the strategic prices and income transfers which
decentralize a core allocation as an approximate Nash equilibrium are exactly the
same as those which decentralize it as a Walrasian equilibrium. In other words the
Walrasian prices which decentralize the core have some approximate Nash property:
unilateral deviations from the profile of strategies which implements those prices
and associated core allocations cannot provide substantial benefits. We conclude
then that in large economies individuals cannot obtain substantial benefits from
manipulating the prices that implement a core allocation, which complements and
confirms the argument in favor of price taking in such environments.
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